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Policymakers have adopted programs mandating parties to sub-
mit their disputes to court-connected arbitration hoping to garner
efficiency benefits commonly associated with contractual Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) arbitration. Mandatory nonbinding arbi-
tration, however, is ill-equipped for this task because it lacks the
consensual core and finality of FAA arbitration. Instead, it often
adds an inefficient layer to the litigation process and may harm
those least able to protect themselves from coerced settlements or
burdens of protracted litigation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Is nonconsensual and nonbinding court-connected arbitration
nonsensical?1 Policymakers established mandatory arbitration pro-
grams on the wings of the pro-arbitration movement that fueled
courts' eager enforcement of arbitration agreements under the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 2 They hoped that court-con-
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I thank the Cardozo Journal
of Conflict Resolution and all the participants in the "Whither Arbitration" symposium. I also
thank Tom Carbonneau, Christopher Drahozal, Mark Loewenstein, and Jean Sternlight for their
comments, and Aaron Clippinger and Leanne Hamilton for their research assistance.
1 Originally this article was entitled "Oxymoronic Arbitration" to highlight the contradic-
tory character of nonconsensual/nonbinding arbitration. See Wiktionary, Oxymoron, http://
en.wiktionary.org/wiki/oxymoron (last visited Sept. 16, 2008) (defining "oxymoron" to include a
"contradiction in terms" and "paradoxical juxtaposition of two seemingly contradictory words").
However, I later learned that I am not the first to raise the question of whether nonbinding
arbitration is an oxymoron. See Kathryn L. Hale, Nonbinding Arbitration: An Oxymoron?, 24
U. TOL. L. REV. 1003, 1003-26 (1993) (discussing the Shaefer v. Allstate court's refusal to en-
force an insurance contract arbitration clause allowing for de novo appeal if the arbitration
award exceeded a certain amount, and noting how this may impact court-administered nonbind-
ing arbitration).
2 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2008) (requiring arbitration only if the parties have
contractually agreed to arbitrate their disputes); see also Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full,
A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litiga-
tion, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1589-92 (1995) [hereinafter Half Full] (discussing the history of
court-connected Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") programs in the wake of the rising
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nected arbitration programs would garner the same sorts of effi-
ciency benefits and process satisfaction that have been associated
with contractual and final FAA arbitration.3 Arbitration had
gained a reputation for producing efficient "justice" through a
faster and cheaper dispute resolution process than parties enjoyed
in trials. The problem is that design flaws of court-connected arbi-
tration programs generally prevent them from purveying "justice."4
Court-connected arbitration is not designed to achieve its
goals of efficiency and fairness.' It is truly "mandatory" arbitration
in the traditional sense.6 Mandatory programs require parties to
participate in dispute resolution proceedings pursuant to govern-
ment order, without the parties' contractual consent. This is unlike
FAA arbitration, which is traditionally justified by its predicate re-
quirement of an agreement to arbitrate.7 This also means that
mandatory programs must allow for trial de novo in order to pre-
serve parties' trial rights.8 In contrast, FAA arbitration is, argua-
use of FAA commercial arbitration and how ADR images "blurred" as ADR moved into the
courts).
3 See John P. Mclver & Susan Keilitz, Court-Annexed Arbitration: An Introduction, 14 JusT.
Sys. J. 123, 123-26 (1991) (noting aims of mandatory programs); see also Court-Ordered Arbi-
tration Program Chart, last updated Jul. 1, 2008 (attached hereto as an appendix with backup on
file with author) (gathering data and legislative or court rule citations for mandatory ADR and
arbitration programs) [hereinafter Arbitration Program Chart].
4 Providing "justice" can often be like a sausage-making process we would rather not watch
so long as it produces good results. As Otto von Bismarck, Germany's first Chancellor, known
for his socially progressive legislation in the late 1800s, said, "[p]eople who love sausage and
people who believe in justice should never watch either of them being made." See Quotations
About Justice, available at http://www.quotegarden.com/justice.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
The problem is court-connected arbitration is often like a flawed sausage-making process that
produces nothing but bad sausage ripe for recall.
5 See Hensler, Half Full, supra note 2, at 1591-95 (noting program problems and imprecise
use of ADR in equating processes that vary significantly in terms of party control).
6 See Mclver & Keilitz, supra note 3, at 123-24 (stating that at the time of the article,
twenty-four states and ten federal districts had adopted such mandatory programs); Roselle L.
Wissler & Bob Dauber, Court-Connected Arbitration in the Superior Court of Arizona: A Study
of Its Performance and Proposed Rule Changes, J. Disp. REsOL. 65, 65 n.1 (2007) (stating eigh-
teen states and three federal districts have mandatory court-annexed arbitration schemes and
citing personal communication with Donna Stienstra, Senior Researcher, Federal Judicial
Center, July 6, 2005).
7 FAA arbitration's legitimacy is also subject to debate, but discussion of this on-going and
complicated debate is beyond the scope of this paper. See Michael Moffitt, Customized Litiga-
tion: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 461, 462-64,
518-19 (2007) (noting litigation's justice-providing function and concerns about arbitration);
Grafton Partners L.P. v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers L.L.P., 116 P.3d 479, 490-93 (Cal. Super. Ct.
2005) (breaking from the majority of courts in refusing to enforce a pre-dispute jury waiver).
8 See U.S. CONsT. amend. VII (providing for right to jury trial only in certain civil cases).
See also Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional
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bly, efficient due to its finality and limited judicial review. 9 The
Supreme Court recently confirmed FAA arbitration's finality in re-
ducing parties' powers to expand judicial review of arbitration
awards under the FAA.10 It opined that limited review of arbitra-
tion is "needed to maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolv-
ing disputes straightaway," while allowing for "full-bore" judicial
appeal would add an inefficient layer to the process."
There are different types of arbitration, and court-connected
varieties may be useful in some contexts. Progressive dispute reso-
lution programs can further public goals. However, this Article fo-
cuses on nonconsensual and nonbinding arbitration programs, and
how they have failed to the extent that they do not serve the goals
of efficiency and justice. Nonconsensual and nonbinding arbitra-
tion programs often seek to feed off of FAA arbitration's momen-
tum, but they are fundamentally different from FAA arbitration.
These court-connected programs force parties to participate in ar-
bitration proceedings in lieu of litigation when they have not con-
tractually agreed to the process. Furthermore, court-mandated
programs' allowance for trial de novo thwarts their efficiency goals,
often producing a muddy mix of arbitration and court
procedures. 12
Evidence supports the conclusion that nonbinding arbitration
programs often add an inefficient layer to the litigation process.
Furthermore, costs and burdens of layered dispute resolution
processes often fall hardest on those who have the least power or
litigation resources.13  At the same time, while programs better
Issues, 68 OR. L. REv. 487, 502-20 (1989) (discussing constitutional arguments against
mandatory arbitration programs).
9 The United States Supreme Court recently emphasized FAA arbitration's efficiency-pro-
moting streamlined process in holding that the FAA preempts state-required administrative
hearings as a pre-condition to contractual arbitration. Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 979-88
(2008) (confirming FAA arbitration's private and stream-lined process).
10 Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402-06 (2008) (emphasizing
the FAA's limited and exclusive grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards in order to
promote arbitration's finality and efficiency).
11 Id. at 1405.
12 See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16,18 (1999) ("Arbi-
trations provide an alternative method of dispute resolution to legal proceedings .... Mixing the
two only produces mud-not the sort of stuff we willingly tread in."); see also Amy J. Schmitz,
Ending a Mud Bowl. Defining Arbitration's Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L.
REv. 123, 123-28 (2002) (stating this quote at the outset and discussing the finality of FAA
arbitration).
13 Parker v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 734 N.E.2d 83, 84-86 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000), cert. denied, 738
N.E.2d 928 (Il1. 2000) (holding de novo review provision of the arbitration clause in an insurance
contract defied public policy due to its impact on the insured).
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promote efficiency by imposing strong disincentives to seek trial de
novo, they also place troubling burdens on parties' trial and due
process rights. Programs must be careful to minimize the total cost
of the dispute resolution system instead of simply seeking to maxi-
mize the settlement rate.'4
Arbitration's familiarity or reputation does not justify continu-
ance of mandatory arbitration programs. 15 The program's allow-
ance of trial de novo is a necessary "evil" in that it is needed to
preserve those trial rights parties have not contractually waived
through an arbitration agreement. However, court-connected arbi-
tration's lack of finality often produces unfairness and inefficiency
through forcing parties to shoulder the burdens of not only partici-
pating in mandatory arbitration proceedings, but also defending
costly and time-consuming de novo attacks on nonbinding awards.
Moreover, the disproportionate burdens of such protracted litiga-
tion perpetuate power imbalances.
In light of these concerns, this Article explores the propriety
and efficacy of these mandatory arbitration programs, focusing
particularly on their lack of consent and finality. Part II of this
Article describes the persistence of nonbinding mandatory arbitra-
tion programs premised on providing efficiency benefits like those
flowing from private arbitration governed by the FAA. Part III
juxtaposes this court-connected arbitration with FAA arbitration in
order to highlight design flaws of nonconsensual and nonfinal
court-connected arbitration. Part IV questions the survival of
court-connected mandatory arbitration programs. As some evi-
dence has indicated, these programs often fail to serve their goals
of efficiency and justice. In light of these considerations, Part V
concludes with the suggestion that policymakers revise or abandon
14 See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CI. L. REV. 366, 368-69, 388-89 (1986) (dis-
cussing proper policy objectives of court-connected ADR programs and explaining how pro-
grams which induce settlement may cause an increase in overall long-run dispute resolution
costs).
15 1 am not the first to call for the reexamination of court-connected arbitration. See Lisa
Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-An-
nexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 2252-53 (1993) (concluding that the fed-
eral courts' mandatory arbitration program was not geared to foster private or social benefits,
and calling for an end to further experimentation with such court-annexed arbitration). How-
ever, this article aims to reignite this examination often neglected in the fray of the current
debate focused on FAA arbitration. See Symposium, Rethinking the Federal Arbitration Act. An
Examination of Whether and How the Statute Should Be Amended, 49 S. TEx. L. REv. 1, 1-473
(2007) (including articles from varying perspectives regarding possible FAA reforms).
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these programs in favor of more efficient and less burdensome
programs.
II. COURT-CONNECTED NONBINDING ARBITRATION PROGRAMS
Arbitration, mediation, and other processes are often well-
suited for efficient and beneficial dispute resolution where parties
have agreed to participate in the process, or the process is geared
for a specialized or communal context. Hoping to harness similar
benefits, policymakers have instituted court-connected programs
requiring parties to participate in nonbinding arbitration proceed-
ings without the parties' consent. Policy makers have premised
these statutory or court-ordered programs on fostering public and
private efficiencies by easing court dockets and assisting parties to
quickly resolve disputes without costly litigation.16 They tout these
programs' goals as decreasing courts' and litigants' dispute resolu-
tion costs, increasing case resolution speed, and thinning courts'
overall caseloads. 17 Although these programs vary, this Article fo-
cuses on those programs which perpetuate nonconsensual and non-
binding arbitration, and as such are ill-suited to serve policy goals.
Policymakers began establishing court-connected mandatory
arbitration programs in the late 1970s and have continued to create
and condone these programs despite legitimacy and efficiency con-
cerns.18 Congress first authorized three federal district courts to
create mandatory arbitration programs in 1978. It then expanded
this authorization and funding to cover additional courts through
the 1980s with support from the Attorney General and other
policymakers. It was hoped that these programs would capture the
efficiency and justice benefits believed to flow from private con-
tractual arbitration.1 9 Courts then used this authorization to insti-
tute programs fueled by the alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") revolution, amidst popular calls for the use of ADR to
ease crowded court dockets and address overly litigious lawyers'
abuses of the judicial process.2 °
16 Mclver & Keilitz, supra note 3, at 123-24; but see Keith 0. Boyum, Afterward: Does
Court-Annexed Arbitration "Work"?, 14 JUST. Sys. J. 244,244-47 (1991) (explaining how admin-
istrators, litigants and lawyers may not all want the same things from court programs).
17 Wissler & Dauber, supra note 6, at 65-66.
18 Mclver & Keilitz, supra note 3, at 123-29 (discussing mandatory arbitration programs).
19 See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 2174-75 (describing establishment of federal court-con-
nected arbitration programs).
20 Id. at 2174-76 (noting the ADR movement's role in fostering these programs).
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Court-connected arbitration programs have expanded since
that time and continue to exist in state and federal courts.2' While
some courts have repealed their programs, others have instituted
new ones.22 My recent tally indicated that twenty-eight states have
programs requiring or allowing judges to mandate litigants' partici-
pation in nonbinding arbitration. 3 In addition, at least ten federal
district courts have adopted programs which allow them to order
nonbinding arbitration.2 4 These court-connected programs apply
where parties have not contractually agreed to submit their dis-
putes to private, binding arbitration under the FAA.
Court-connected programs do not all simply require arbitra-
tion. Instead, many programs are more nuanced and incorporate
mediation and other facilitative processes. Some programs also
seek to enhance parties' control over the dispute resolution process
by allowing them to choose from among various ADR processes. 26
Programs may allow parties to combine facilitative and evaluative
processes through a program called Med/Arb, which effectively
transforms unsuccessful mediation into arbitration.27
21 See id. at 2173-75 (noting the persistence of these programs in 1993); Arbitration Program
Chart, supra note 3 (gathering data and citations for programs requiring use of nonbinding arbi-
tration in state and federal courts).
22 For example, Colorado repealed its Mandatory Arbitration Act. See CoLo. REV.
STAT.§ 13-22-401 et seq. (1991) (covering certain civil actions seeking damages of $50,000 or less,
although the statute had survived constitutional attack). See Firelock v. District Court., 729 P.2d
1090 (Colo. 1989) (denying a challenge under the Colorado Constitution). Meanwhile, the Supe-
rior Court of Delaware recently revised its rules to continue to allow judges to order compulsory
use of ADR, although it also gives parties power to choose the process. Del. Ct. Order 03 (Feb.
5, 2008) (repealing Rule 16.1 and amending Rule 16).
23 Arbitration Program Chart, supra note 3.
24 Id.
25 Donna Shestowsky, Disputants' Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Pro-
cedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 549,
584-92 (2008) (discussing varied programs and some movement toward mediation, but noting
that arbitration is also commonly ordered).
26 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., S.J.C. ch. l(b)(iv) (2008). These rules state "[i]nformed
choice of process and provider" is a guiding principle for the program and allow parties to choose
from among the approved ADR programs established, but it also give courts power in making
final process determinations despite another proviso that parties' participation must remain vol-
untary. Id.
27 See U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules N.D. Ala., ADR Plan (current with amendments through Feb. 1,
2008), available at http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/local/adr-plan.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2008)
(seeming to give the arbitrator the power to refer cases to the "Med/Arb Track" in the courts'
ADR program, but leaving the ultimate decision of pursuing this track to the parties). It seems
the parties would have to consent to Med/Arb in light of confidentiality and other concerns
flowing from a mediator's conversion into a more evaluative arbitrator.
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Still, parties' preferences remain a secondary concern in most
court programs. 8 Many programs mandate nonbinding arbitration
for specified cases, or give judges broad discretion in sending cases
to court-connected arbitration. 29  Therefore, court-connected arbi-
tration programs continue to survive and, in some courts, thrive.
Most court-connected programs target specified classes of civil
cases, and many of them are limited to claims for damages under
stated dollar amounts.3 ° My recent review of programs revealed
jurisdictional limit amounts ranging from roughly $6,000 to
$150,000.31 Although these jurisdictional limits vary widely, most
programs target small civil claims for money judgments on the the-
ory that these cases generally have fewer complicating factors and
are the most ripe for expedited resolution procedures. 32 Presuma-
bly, policymakers have targeted these small dollar cases in an effort
to save parties and courts from litigation time and costs, which may
effectively preclude plaintiffs from seeking or obtaining remedies
in these cases. Nonetheless, many programs apply to a broad range
of civil and other claims.
Mandatory programs also tend to leave it to the judges' discre-
tion to use court power to order mandatory ADR as a precursor to
any litigation.33 They focus on judicial needs, seeking to save the
parties' and courts' time and resources without jeopardizing par-
ties' access to justice.34 To that end, most programs require that an
ordered arbitration hearing, or other ADR process, must take
28 See Shestowsky, supra note 25, at 589-600 (discussing evidence that parties often have
little or stifled voice in choosing an ADR method).
29 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-549u-aa (2008); Sup. Ct. Civ. R. § 23-61 (2007) (giving
courts discretion to order cases to nonbinding arbitration where the expected judgment is less
than $50,000 and a claim for a trial by jury and a certificate of closed pleading has been filed).
30 Wissler & Dauber, supra note 6, at 68 n.17 (also noting that some states do not prescribe a
dollar limit).
31 Arbitration Program Chart, supra note 3. The New York programs' limit was particularly
low at $6,000 (except $10,000 in N.Y. Civil Court), while $150,000 was the limit in most of the
federal district court programs. Id.
32 See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:23A-20 (2007) (requiring personal injury cases to be submit-
ted to arbitration where the amount in controversy is $20,000 or less, and permitting in §2A:23A-
20(b) consensual submission to arbitration of such cases regardless of amount if "the court de-
termines that the controversy does not involve novel legal or unduly complex factual issues").
See also Mclver & Keilitz, supra note 3, at 124-25 (summarizing program data reported at a Law
and Society Association meeting in 1989).
33 See WiS. STAT. § 802.12(2) (1994) (giving judges discretion over which cases to refer to
ADR and which ADR processes to order).
34 See e.g., Mo. R. S. CT. R. 17.01(a) (stating the ADR program's purpose as permitting
courts to order ADR procedures "for disposition before trial of certain civil cases with resultant
savings in time and expense to the litigants and to the court without sacrificing the quality of
justice.").
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place within a stated time from the submission order. Such time
limits generally range from forty-five to 120 days following an arbi-
trator's appointment. 35 Program rules also may specify that an or-
dered arbitration procedure must not begin before a stated number
of days following a submission order to give parties time to prepare
their cases. For example, New Jersey's mandatory arbitration pro-
gram for personal injury claims requires that hearings not begin
earlier than forty-five days following a notice of submission, and
not before the end of an applicable discovery period.36 Arbitration
hearings must not take place later than sixty days following the
expiration of that waiting period. 37
Rules for arbitration programs also often require speedy
awards after hearings have closed. They generally require that ar-
bitrators must issue an award within a stated number of days, rang-
ing from three to 120 days after the close of hearings. Rules also
limit parties' time for rejecting an award and seeking trial de novo.
This usually ranges from ten to thirty days.38 Parties must accept
the awards they do not challenge within the stated time. Further-
more, some states also provide that parties automatically lose their
right to challenge an award or seek trial de novo if they fail to
appear at the arbitration hearing.39
Courts establish programs with the hope that the parties will
accept nonbinding arbitration awards, or voluntarily settle disputes
based on awards as evaluations of likely trial outcomes.4 ° Many
programs reinforce this hope by imposing disincentives for de-
manding trial de novo. 41 These de facto penalties for seeking trial
35 See Mclver & Keilitz, supra note 3, at 125-30 (providing charts based on several studies);
Wissler & Dauber supra note 6, at 71-72 (focusing on Arizona's program but also providing
comparative data).
36 N.J. STAT. ANN. Part IV, Rules of Ct., R. 4:21A-1(d) (2007) (stating time frames for sched-
uling arbitration hearings).
37 Id.
38 Wissler & Dauber, supra note 6, at 65-66.
39 See Suzanne J. Schmitz et al., Survey of Illinois Law: Mandatory Arbitration, 23 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 843, 848-55 (1999) (summarizing rules and law regarding Illinois program requirements
eliminating a party's right to reject an award if she fails to attend arbitration hearings).
40 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANr., Part IV, Rules of Ct., R. 4:21A-5 (2007) (requiring a written
award be filed within ten days following completion of an arbitration hearing, and stating that
the award must include notice of parties' right to "request a trial de novo and the consequences
of such a request as provided by" rules requiring the party demanding trial to pay certain costs).
41 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN., Part IV, Rules of Ct., R. 4:21A-6(c) (2007) (requiring a party
that demands trial to pay the court $200 toward the arbitrator's fees and possibly the non-de-
manding parties' costs and attorney's fees if that party does not obtain a verdict at least 20%
more favorable than the arbitration award or at least $250 if the award had denied money
damages).
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de novo have raised constitutional challenges, but courts generally
uphold the penalties by finding that they are not overly restrictive
on trial rights.42 This creates a game of chicken for parties who
seek trial in that they must face liability for arbitration fees, trial de
novo costs and/or non-demanding parties' attorney's fees if the
trial does not result in a verdict or judgment that is a stated per-
centage or amount higher than the arbitration award. 3
For example, Nevada's mandatory arbitration program in-
cludes various measures that have prompted parties to settle or ac-
cept arbitration awards in an unprecedented eighty percent of
cases entering the program.44 Nevada's required "[d]isincentives
to appeal" non-binding arbitration include admission of arbitra-
tors' findings in any trial de novo.45 Program rules also impose a
strict thirty-day limit on filing any request for trial de novo, deem
failure to pay arbitrators as a waiver of such trial, and entitle the
prevailing party at any trial de novo to recover arbitration fees,
costs, and interest. 6 In addition, a party challenging an award of
$20,000 or less who fails to obtain a judgment that exceeds (if
claimant) or lowers (if respondent) the award by at least twenty
percent must pay the other party attorney's fees and costs follow-
ing the request for trial de novo.47 For awards over $20,000, similar
rules apply if the challenging party fails to obtain a ten percent
better result in the trial de novo than the party obtained in arbitra-
tion.48 Similarly, Arizona's program requires the appellant to re-
imburse the county for arbitrators' fees and to pay appellee the
costs, attorney's fees and expert witness fees in connection with a
trial de novo that does not result in a sufficiently better judgment.49
42 See Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1096-97 (Colo. 1989) (upholding states'
since-repealed mandatory arbitration program because it allowed for de novo review, although it
required appellants to pay costs if they do not improve their positions in trial de novo).
43 See Mclver & Keilitz, supra note 3, at 129-31.
44 See Chris A. Beecroft, Jr. & Wesley M. Ayres, The State of Court Connected ADR, NEV.
LAW. (Oct. 2007) (reporting these rates, and noting that 54% of these cases assigned to arbitra-
tion are settled prior to filing of the award).
45 NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.250-259 (2005, and current through 2007), available at http://
leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-038.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2008); NEV. A" . R. 1-24 (2005 and cur-
rent through 2007), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/RGADR.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2008).
46 NEV. ARB. R. 18, 19 (2005).
47 NEV. ARB. R. 20(B) (2005).
48 Id.
49 Wissler & Dauber, supra note 6, at 72. See also Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Court-Annexed
Arbitration in Clark County Nevada: An Evaluation of Its Impact on the Pace, Cost, and Quality
of Civil Justice, 18 JUST. Sys. J. 287, 290-93 (1996) (describing similar trial de novo penalties if
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The arbitration or other ADR procedures themselves also
come with costs regardless of whether the parties seek trial de novo
after completing the procedures. The parties, or in a minority of
programs the state, must pay the arbitrator's hourly, case, or day
fees. 50 Although this may be less costly than trial, it is more expen-
sive for parties and courts to resolve disputes in arbitration than
through private settlement negotiations.5 Under Florida's court-
ordered nonbinding arbitration program, for example, parties (or
upon a showing of indigence, the state) must compensate arbitra-
tors up to $1,500 per diem.52 At the same time, parties may incur
hefty attorney's fees for legal representation in arbitration pro-
ceedings and throughout often elaborate filings and procedures for
objecting to arbitration hearings, orders and awards.53
Still, arbitration hearings that end the parties' disputes may
save them time and money. Parties ordered to arbitrate under
these programs may pay less in attorney's fees and other costs in
arbitration hearings than they would pay in a court trial. However,
these court-ordered arbitrations lack the contractual waiver of trial
rights, and thus the finality, of FAA arbitration.54 This means par-
ties may pay fees and costs of not only the arbitration or other
ADR procedures, but also of an eventual trial. In the end, court-
mandated programs may result in sizable bills for parties and
courts.
party's position does not improve); Schmitz et al., supra note 39, at 845-46 (noting that the one
requesting trial de novo must pay a rejection fee as high as $500).
50 Wissler & Dauber, supra note 6, at 70 n. 31 (noting that case/day fees range from $75 to
$350 or hourly rates of $100 to $150 depending on the jurisdiction).
51 See Posner, supra note 14, at 390-92 (highlighting cost and legality objections to court-
annexed arbitration, and noting how many cases ordered to arbitration would have otherwise
been settled privately).
52 FLA. STAT. § 44.103(3) (2007).
53 See D.C. R. Civ. ARB R. I-XVI (1993) (providing rules for court-connected arbitration
program); see also Posner, supra note 14, at 391-92 (showing by example how court-annexed
arbitration generally do not lower dispute resolution costs).
54 This mandatory and nonbinding nature of government-mandated arbitration also means
that these arbitration proceedings are subject to their own particular rules, and not the law or
rules of the FAA or UAA. Mclver & Keilitz, supra note 3, at 125-28: Wissler & Dauber, supra
note 6, at 65-66.
2009] COURT-CONNECTED ARBITRATION PROGRAMS 597
III. ASSENT AND FINALITY FOUNDATIONS OF
PRIVATE ARBITRATION
Non-binding arbitration seeks to garner efficiency benefits
similar to those in FAA arbitration. However, FAA arbitration is
fundamentally different due to its contractual core and efficiency-
promoting finality. The FAA requires courts to order parties to
comply with their agreements to arbitrate instead of litigate their
claims to further freedom of contract, and save parties time and
money resolving disputes outside of courts. FAA arbitration thus
differs from nonbinding court-connected mandatory arbitration be-
cause it is consensual and private. It is also final and subject to
very limited judicial review. This finality guards parties from po-
tentially suffering the time, expense, and stress of pursuing their
claims twice through court-connected programs: first in arbitration
and then in court.
A. FAA Arbitration's Contractual Core
Various types of communities have used private arbitration
systems to resolve their disputes through efficient and peace-pro-
moting processes.55 These arbitration systems have flourished both
in ancient and modern communities because they are consensual,
private and final. In addition, arbitration systems have been espe-
cially useful where parties share expectations and understandings
of the arbitration process, and of the legal and business norms that
arbitrators apply in determining disputes.5 6 These mutual under-
standings also help ensure the parties' voluntary compliance with
arbitration agreements.57
55 JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 25-38, 115-17 (1918)
(recounting arbitration's "purpose of settling (appease) the controversies and differences," and
noting arbitrations in various forms in France, Scotland, Denmark, Ireland, Austria-Hungary,
Iran, Japan, India, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden, and Portugal).
56 Margit Mantica, Arbitration in Ancient Egypt, 12 AR. J. 155, 155-59 (1957) (noting arbi-
tration as "an ancient institution" predating state established judicial tribunals); see also Earl S.
Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 144
(1934) (reporting patriarchal tribunals in early societies).
57 See William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A
Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L. Q. 193, 198-200, 211-12 (1930) (depicting arbitration among
mercantile communities); SAMUEL ROSENBAUM, A REPORT ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN
ENGLAND 13-14 (1916); Wolaver, supra note 56, at 144 (noting how arbitration predates
litigation).
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Nonetheless, there were cases in which parties sought judicial
help in requiring contracting partners to comply with their arbitra-
tion agreements and awards. Merchants and attorneys aware of
arbitration's prevalence banded together to support legislation that
would require courts to specifically enforce arbitration agreements
and awards.5 8 This became known as the 1925 arbitration enforce-
ment legislation we now recognize as the FAA on the federal level,
and the nearly identical Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA") on the
state level. 9
These Acts require courts to enforce arbitration agreements
and limit their intervention in arbitration proceedings and review
of awards.6 ° Therefore, courts are directed to specifically enforce
agreements to arbitrate.61 In addition, they reinforce parties' com-
pliance with arbitration agreements by providing liberal venue pro-
visions, by allowing for immediate appeals from orders adverse to
arbitration, limiting review of awards, and treating of awards as
judgments.62
FAA arbitration enforcement thus relies on the existence of a
valid arbitration agreement. However, the genuineness of the req-
uisite "agreement" has validly become the subject of debate as
FAA enforcement of arbitration agreements has expanded from its
merchant roots to consumer, employment, and other uneven bar-
58 Daniel Bloomfield, SELECTED ARTICLES ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 14 (citing Julius
H. Barnes. International Chamber of Commerce, Digest No. 44 (April 1923)) (noting merchants'
reliance on consensual arbitration to facilitate trade); see Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of
the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States,
11 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 479, 491-99 (1995) (proposing attorneys had a significant role in securing
adoption of arbitration statutes as a means of ensuring their role in the process).
59 The states adopted the UAA in its original or substantially similar form, which tracked the
FAA. Unif. Arbitration Act ("UAA"), 7 U.L.A. § 1 et seq. (1997). Since then, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law ("NCCUSL") proposed a revised UAA
that states are now in the process of considering. Unif. Arbitration Act (amended 2000) 7
U.L.A. 1 (2005); see The RUAA Moves Toward National Passage, DisP. RESOL. J., 5 (May-July
2002) (noting as of 2002 that forty-nine states adopted the original UAA, while only a handful of
states have adopted the 2000 revised UAA). Some have argued that the 2000 version has the
potential of undermining the finality core of arbitration. See Michael H. LeRoy, Misguided Fair-
ness? Regulating Arbitration by Statute: Empirical Evidence of Declining Award Finality, 83 No.
TRa DAME L. REv. 551, 556-59 (2008) (supporting this claim with empirical evidence).
60 Bloomfield, supra note 58, at 1-16 (citing Julius H. Barnes. International Chamber of
Commerce, Digest No. 44 (April 1923)).
61 See Schmitz, supra note 12, at 145-56 (discussing enforcement schemes of the FAA and
UAA and their development as a means for reversing prior judicial hostility toward arbitration
and ensuring efficiency and independence of arbitration proceedings).
62 See id.
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gaining contexts.63 In these contexts, the meaning of "consent"
and the line between mandatory and consensual arbitration gov-
erned by the FAA is blurred. Some scholars and practitioners
question the legitimacy of employees' and consumers' "consent" to
arbitration when companies routinely include nonnegotiable arbi-
tration provisions in adhesive contracts.64 The FAA nonetheless
places the burden on these employees and consumers to prove the
invalidity of these arbitration provisions, while courts apply con-
tract defenses in formulaic and efficiency-focused fashions.65
Furthermore, courts applying the FAA generally enforce arbi-
tration provisions in terms that parties must accept as a precondi-
tion to trading, participating or working in the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") or National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD") markets.66  Compliance with these arbitration provi-
sions is therefore de facto mandatory. However, it is not
"mandatory" in the traditional government-mandated sense be-
cause it is contractual and one may choose to not work or deal in
these markets. Securities arbitration is also publicly regulated to
the extent the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") en-
joys regulatory authority over its proceedings, seeking to ensure
certain procedural protections.67
63 See Jean R. Sternlight, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration (if Imposed on the Company),
8 NEV. L.J. 82, 82-100 (2007) (highlighting how companies impose pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments on consumers and employees in the context of proposing legal reform to ensure consum-
ers' free consent to binding arbitration); Katherine Palm, Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Home
Admission Agreements: Framing the Debate, 14 ELDER L.J. 453, 453-54, 481-83 (arguing that
arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts are essentially mandatory). But see Christo-
pher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695, 741-54 (questioning
claims that form arbitration provisions in consumer contracts are unfair); Robert A. Hillman &
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429,
435-51, 485-87 (2002) (explaining why electronic contracts are efficient and not adhesive).
64 See Sternlight, supra note 63, at 82-100; Palm, supra note 63, at 453-54, 481-83.
65 See Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of "Contracting Culture" in Enforcing Arbitration Pro-
visions, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 121, 139-44 (discussing courts' formalistic application of contract
defenses to arbitration clauses).
66 See Edward S. O'Neal & Daniel R. Solin, Mandatory Arbitration of Securities Disputes: A
Statistical Analysis of How Claimants Fare (2007) (working paper), available at http://www.slcg.
com/pdf/workingpapers/Mandatory%20Arbitration%20Study.pdf (discussing compulsory bind-
ing arbitration through National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") or New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE")); see Joel Seligman, The Quiet Revolution: Securities Arbitration
Confronts the Hard Questions, 33 Hous. L. REV. 327 (1996) (discussing how arbitration under
NASD or NYSE rules has become mandatory under most broker-dealer contracts).
67 The NASD, for example, is a self-regulatory agency that must act pursuant to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934 and federal directives of the SEC geared to protect customers
from securities fraud. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Dispute Resolution
to Provide Arbitration Awards Online (May 10, 2001), available at http://www.nasd.com/ (type:
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Still, this raises significant questions regarding FAA enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements in uneven or other one-sided con-
tracting contexts. However, that ongoing debate is beyond the
scope of this Article. Furthermore, the FAA's contractual core is
important. It remains a distinguishing feature of FAA arbitration,
and is what legitimizes courts' use of the FAA to strictly enforce
arbitration agreements and awards as the parties' waivers of their
rights to trial.68 This contractual core is also subject to contract
defenses that may preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements
and police their fairness to a certain extent.69 FAA arbitration is
therefore different from court-connected mandatory arbitration or-
dered despite the lack of an arbitration agreement.
B. FAA Arbitration's Finality and Limited Court Review
The FAA does not directly define "arbitration."7 Although
courts have taken various approaches to whether the FAA applies
to non-binding dispute resolution methods,71 most have read the
FAA to apply only to final and binding arbitration that will "settle"
or end a dispute.72 FAA arbitration is therefore very different
"NASD Dispute Resolution to Provide Arbitration Awards Online" into the "search" box, then
click on the first available article) (stating how NASD worked with the Securities Arbitration
Commentator to make awards readily accessible online and maintain the library of awards).
68 See McCabe v. Dell, Inc., No. CV 06-7811-RGK, 2007 WL 1434972, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
12, 2007) (finding computer sales contract adhesive but upholding its imposition on the con-
sumer of a duty to arbitrate due to its cost-justification); Schuman v. IKON Office Solutions,
Inc., 232 Fed. Appx. 659, 662-663 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding arbitration clause in an employee's
sales commission contract was not unconscionable).
69 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting the formulaic and limited application of
these contract defenses).
70 Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1207 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Karthaus v.
Yllas Y Ferrer, 26 U.S. 222 (1828) (wrestling with the meaning of arbitration). The revisers of
the UAA also opted not to define "arbitration." See Richard E. Speidel, ICANN Domain Name
Dispute Resolution, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, and the Limitations of Modern Arbi-
tration Law, 6 J. OF SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 167, 189 (2002).
71 See AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 462-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding a
nominally non-binding dispute resolution mechanism specifically enforceable under the FAA
and the court's "equity jurisdiction" because the procedure in fact would end the dispute); see
also Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 749 n.10 (E.D. Va. 2001) (finding the FAA
applies to only binding arbitration and characterizing the AMF Inc. court's enforcement of the
agreement as based not on the FAA but on contract law and the court's equitable powers); see
Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343, 345-50 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding the FAA did not
apply to nonbinding dispute resolution mechanisms not likely to end disputes).
72 See Ian R. Macneil, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 7 (1992) (defining arbitration's characteristics to include "a binding
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from court-connected nonbinding arbitration subject to trial de
novo. The FAA directs that courts may only vacate arbitration
awards on limited grounds focused on ensuring procedural and
fundamental fairness aspects such as fraud, evident partiality or
corruption among the arbitrators, other misbehavior that
prejudices a party's rights, or arbitrators' exercise of power beyond
their contractual charge.73 This finality fosters FAA arbitration's
efficiency, and saves parties from having to essentially litigate their
claims twice: first, in arbitration, and then in court.
The United States Supreme Court has reinforced FAA arbi-
tration's streamlined process and efficiency-promoting finality.
Recently, the Court highlighted arbitration's streamlined process
in holding that the FAA required television's "Judge Alex" to pro-
ceed with arbitration pursuant to his prior agreement without first
stopping for an administrative determination of claims by the Cali-
fornia Labor Commissioner concerning the California Talent
Agency Act ("TAA"). 74  Shortly thereafter, the Court in Hall
Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008), con-
firmed the finality of FAA arbitration.75 The Court ruled in a six-
three decision that the FAA precludes contractual expansion of ju-
dicial review of arbitration awards beyond the limited grounds pro-
vided in the FAA §§ 9_11.76 The majority emphasized that the
award" with the arbitrator's decision "subject to very limited grounds of review, final and en-
forceable by State law in the same manner as a judgment"); see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009) (di-
recting FAA's application to written agreements "to settle by arbitration" disputes arising out of
transactions involving interstate commerce); 7 U.L.A. § 1 (1997) (prescribing UAA's application
to agreements to "submit" disputes to arbitration); Wesley A. Sturges, Arbitration-What Is It?,
35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1960) (emphasizing arbitration's role as a conclusive process); 1
GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01 at 1 (3d ed. 1989) (cita-
tions omitted) (similarly defining arbitration).
73 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2009). The UAA and RUAA provide essentially the same limited grounds
for judicial review of arbitration awards. UAA § 12; RUAA § 23(a)(1-6). If the parties do not
agree that judgment may be entered on an award, the FAA does not apply to enforcement of the
award. See Oklahoma City Assoc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 923 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1991).
74 Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 979-88 (2008) (discussing Ferrer's alleging his contract to
pay Preston for his services was unenforceable under the TAA because Preston had acted as a
talent agent without the required license).
75 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396-1408 (2008) (emphasizing the
FAA's limited and exclusive grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards in order to pro-
mote arbitration's finality and efficiency). This decision has been subject to scholarly critique.
See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Fear of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 469, 469-511 (2008) (critiqu-
ing the Hall Street opinion and result, and raising important questions regarding its application in
the wake of Hall Street).
76 In Hall Street, the Oregon district court had ordered the parties to arbitrate indemnifica-
tion claims under their agreement, which allowed a court to vacate any award based on errone-
ous conclusions of law or findings of fact not supported by "substantial evidence." Hall St.
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FAA's limited review of awards is key to "maintain[ing] arbitra-
tion's essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway," and sig-
naled fear that allowance for more searching or substantive review
of awards would render arbitration an inefficient layer within the
litigation process.77
Courts since Hall Street have disagreed regarding available
means for avoiding the FAA's strictly limited review.78 However,
FAA arbitration is still essentially final and subject to limited re-
view, which makes it different from court-connected mandatory ar-
bitration. Court-ordered arbitration does not even purport to be
based on an arbitration agreement and is subject to trial de novo.
Ostensibly, policymakers establish these arbitration programs in an
effort to promote efficient, amicable and just dispute resolution
similar to resolution parties may achieve through FAA arbitration.
However, it is questionable whether court-ordered nonbinding ar-
bitration in fact fosters these goals.
IV. MISFIT CHARACTER OF NONCONSENSUAL NON-
FINAL ARBITRATION
Programs that simply mandate arbitration are giving way to
programs that allow for mediation and other forms of ADR.79
However, even nuanced ADR programs urge settlement based on
evaluative nonbinding determinations in lieu of garnering organic
resolutions.8 0  In addition, courts are given great discretion in or-
Assocs., L.L.C., 128 S. Ct. at 1400-02. The Court noted that the prior courts had assumed the
parties contemplated FAA arbitration, but that other authority outside of the FAA may allow
for more searching review. Id. at 1406-07.
77 Id. at 1404-06.
78 See Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 233-45 (2008) (find-
ing Hall Street left open state law means for expanding review of arbitration awards and that
California law permits merits review of arbitration awards pursuant to parties' contracts preclud-
ing arbitrator's power to commit errors of law). But see Acuna v. Aerofreeze, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-
432 (TJW), 2008 WL 4755749, at 2-3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2008) (noting that the Fifth Circuit has
indicated that manifest disregard review is no longer available after Hall Street and refusing to
find the arbitrator exceeded his power by failing to follow Texas law); see Wood v. Penntex
Resources, LP, 2008 SL 2609319 (S.D. Tex. June 27, 2008) (finding that even if the contract is
read to preclude the arbitrator's authority to commit factual error, the court would not review
for such merit review under the holding of Hall Street because to do so "would result in pre-
cisely the 'full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals' that the Court held the FAA precluded").
79 See Shestowsky, supra note 25, at 585-90 (noting prevalence of mediation, but acknowl-
edging that arbitration is also common and there is great variance in programs).
80 See id. at 585-95, 624-25 (noting the great latitude courts have in choosing what proce-
dure to order and highlighting the surprising lack of attention to parties' preferences).
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dering ADR and continue to mandate arbitration despite program
design defects based on unproven assumptions and mixed or prob-
lematic research.8 ' Court-ordered arbitration's nonconsensual na-
ture and allowance for trial de novo thwarts its legitimacy and
efficiency. Evidence suggests that instead of promoting just and
efficient dispute resolution, court-ordered arbitration proceedings
are often inefficient and expensive stops on the way to litigation.
A. Lack of Consensual Core
Court-connected mandated arbitration has raised constitu-
tional and other concerns due to its involuntary nature. Courts
have entertained challenges of mandatory programs on grounds
that they violate federal and state jury trial, due process, court ac-
cess, equal protection, and separation of powers rights.82 From
these challenges, arguments based on federal and state constitu-
tional rights to a jury trial on legal causes of action have carried the
most weight.83 Furthermore, such state constitutional challenges
may be stronger than such federal challenges due to the states' jury
access provisions. 84 These challenges have produced a rule requir-
ing that court-ordered arbitration of legal claims traditionally tried
by a jury must be subject to trial de novo. The government cannot
81 See Ettie Ward, Mandatory Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution in the United
States Federal Courts: Panacea or Pandemic?, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 77, 80-95 (2007) (noting the
variance and discretion of courts in order ADR, and questioning the lack of research and consid-
ered judgment regarding courts' use of ADR programs); see also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.
v. Broadnax, 827 P.2d 531, 534-41 (Colo. 1992) (upholding since repealed statute that required
compulsory arbitration of personal injury protection insurance benefits, as part of a program to
foster efficient dispute resolution).
82 See Golann, supra note 8, at 493-502 (discussing constitutional challenges of mandatory
ADR programs); see also William T. Hudgins, The Fragile Right to a Civil Jury Trial in Colorado,
27 COLO. LAW. 49 (Jan. 1998) (warning attorneys regarding "the fragile right to a civil jury trial
in Colorado").
83 Id. at 502-15 (discussing these claims and explaining the application of jury trial rights to
legal causes that would have allowed for a jury at common law).
84 See Matthew Parrott, Is Compulsory Court-Annexed Medical Malpractice Arbitration Con-
stitutional? How the Debate Reflects a Trend Towards Compulsion in Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2689-90, 2720-30 (2007) (noting state court challenges based
on jury trial rights); see also Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 482-83 (Cal.
2005) (discussing state constitutional rights to a jury trial that may be stronger than parallel
federal rights).
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force parties to forego trial rights." This means these arbitrations
are nonbinding and beyond the purview of the FAA.8 6
Nonbinding arbitration programs have nonetheless been at-
tacked on jury access grounds where they impose unreasonable
penalties or burdens on a litigant's access to trial de novo.87 For
example, litigants have challenged mandatory program provisions
that require parties who demand trial de novo to pay arbitration
costs and opponents' attorney's fees if they do not obtain suffi-
ciently more successful results in trial. They argue that high costs
and fees effectually preclude their realistic and constitutionally
protected access to trial.88
These challenges have been largely unsuccessful. Most courts
have been fairly tolerant of such limitations on de novo review of
court-connected arbitration, viewing limits as necessary vehicles
for easing court caseloads. For example, most courts agree that
cost or fee-shifting provisions are permissible as reasonable limita-
tions on trial rights.89 They also justify such penalties as consistent
with the traditional English rule that shifts counsel fees to the los-
ing party in litigation.90 Furthermore, courts strictly enforce short
time limits on post-arbitration requests for trial de novo.91
Despite these hurdles to seeking trial de novo of court-con-
nected arbitration, one may argue that these programs are still less
burdensome than FAA arbitration on parties' judicial access in
light of the FAA's preclusion of substantive court review of arbi-
tration. However, the FAA only applies where parties have con-
tractually agreed to arbitrate. In contrast, court-connected
arbitration lacks that consensual core.91 Parties also may use and
accept arbitration provisions in their contracts due to shared un-
85 See Golann, supra note 8, at 502-15. Some binding arbitration programs have been up-
held with respect to statutory claims that do not involve jury rights, such as claims under no-fault
insurance statutes. Id. at 504-05.
86 See Parrott, supra note 84, at 2720 (explaining that court-annexed arbitration must allow
for trial de novo to survive constitutional challenges); see also Schmitz, supra note 12, at 124-32
(discussing the meaning of finality under the FAA).
87 See Golann, supra note 8, at 505-07.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 507-10,
90 Id. at 510.
91 See Daniel Morman & Jonathan Whitcomb, Navigating the Nonbinding Arbitration
Minefield in Florida, 81 FLA. B.J. 18-20 (2007) (discussing the perils of nonbinding arbitration in
Florida).
92 See Berstein, supra note 15, at 2250-51.
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derstandings and respect for the process, which is generally lacking
in court-mandated arbitration.93
In essence, court-connected programs may force parties to set-
tle or accept nominally nonbinding arbitration decisions where par-
ties face penalties such as imposition of costs and attorney's fees if
they fail to end disputes without litigation. These penalties create a
de facto fee for demanding trial, despite the absence of statutory
support for such a fee generally. 94 Moreover, penalty risks of seek-
ing trial de novo may disproportionately burden the poorer liti-
gants and those with small dollar claims.95 These parties' fear of
the risk of appeal may force them to accept an unfavorable award
or the more powerful parties' settlement terms. Parties with legal
and economic resources also may take advantage of these fears and
inabilities to bear litigation costs in challenging arbitration awards
they view as unfavorable.
At the same time, the involuntary nature of court-connected
arbitration may thwart organic settlement processes or even spark
antagonisms of parties who resent being forced to pursue such
processes. Some evidence suggests that these court-ordered pro-
grams are less likely to foster settlement than are arbitration
processes pursuant to voluntary agreements. 96 In a study of Assis-
tant U.S. Attorneys' use of ADR in civil cases from 1995 to 1998,
researchers determined that seventy-one percent of cases using
voluntary ADR settled as compared to fifty percent of cases using
court-ordered processes.97
The evidence also suggested that court-ordered ADR may
heighten already constrained relations in particular contexts
poorly-suited for mandatory ADR, such as employment discrimi-
nation cases.98 More research is nonetheless needed to assess the
functionality of court ADR programs, as well as their effects, suc-
93 See Schmitz, supra note 65, at 126-27, 154-59 (discussing the generally "intra-communal"
understandings and acceptance of arbitration provisions in commercial construction
contracting).
94 See Posner, supra note 14, at 391 (noting legality concerns with court-connected
arbitration).
95 See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 2170-75, 2229-38 (noting court-connected programs' im-
pacts on parties' litigation decisions).
96 Lisa B. Bingham et al., Dispute Resolution and the Vanishing Trial: Comparing Federal
Government Litigation and ADR Outcomes (May 1, 2008), available at http//ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1127878 (reporting results of a study of civil cases completed by assistant U.S. attorneys
during 1995-1998, and comparing findings regarding use of voluntary versus involuntary ADR).
97 Id. at 33-34.
98 Id. (discussing study results indicating lower settlement through court-ordered ADR in
employment discrimination versus tort cases).
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cesses and failures.99 Furthermore, it is not surprising that those
who voluntarily choose to use an ADR process are more likely to
settle than those ordered to go through the process.
The nonconsensual nature of court-ordered processes raises
constitutional questions and may thwart parties' court access. Fur-
thermore, these programs' lack of consensual core creates an awk-
ward push-pull towards or away from more organic or amicable
settlement. On the one hand, they may push parties, especially
those with less litigation resources, to settle or accept arbitration
awards due to fear of protracted litigation costs and penalties of
pursuing trial de novo. On the other hand, these programs may
pull parties away from negotiations or other voluntary settlements
by fanning adversarial flames and resentful feelings toward court
pressures.
B. Allowance for De Novo Review
Like court-connected programs' lack of consent, their allow-
ance for trial de novo similarly has contradictory and often detri-
mental effects on efficiency and justice of dispute resolution.
Allowance for trial de novo arguably is necessary to preserve due
process rights that parties have not waived in an arbitration agree-
ment. Furthermore, it may provide an escape hatch from rogue or
unwarranted arbitration decisions. However, that escape hatch
also hinders dispute resolution efficiency where it transforms arbi-
tration into a costly layer on an already exhausting litigation pro-
cess. Moreover, costly burdens of such prolonged processes
generally fall hardest on those with the least financial and litigation
resources. This makes court programs allowing trial de novo both
a blessing and curse.
1. Inefficiency of the Trial De Novo Escape-Hatch
Court-connected arbitration's nonbinding nature raises signifi-
cant questions regarding its efficiency. 100 As noted above, these
arbitration programs may hinder dispute resolution efficiency by
pushing parties away from the bargaining table, and derailing the
99 Id. at 40-41 (noting lack of research).
100 See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 2170-75, 2250-53 (discussing how mandatory ADR pro-
grams are unable to provide benefits of ADR pursuant to parties' contractual commitments
suited to their disputes and relationships, and concluding that these programs in the federal
courts are unwarranted due to their failure to produce private or social benefits).
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possibility of organic early settlements. 1 1 This may occur, for ex-
ample, where courts use these programs to force participation in a
court-connected process by parties with grudges or other negative
feelings that need lag time to subside to a level that allows for ne-
gotiated settlement. Evidence has indicated that ordered participa-
tion in an ADR process may hinder parties' private negotiations,
thereby increasing dispute resolution costs overall. 0
Parties who are already fearful of appearing "weak" also may
assume more defensive postures during the arbitration process and
refuse out-of-hand any nonbinding arbitration decisions. 3 These
parties cannot "blame" acceptance of arbitration decisions on a
pre-dispute contract requiring them to accept any award as binding
and subject to limited review under the FAA. Instead, the non-
binding nature of court-connected programs leaves parties free to
employ inefficient and often expensive posturing by challenging
awards and beginning the litigation processes anew.10 4
Some programs allow parties to hinder the process at several
junctures along the way. First, some programs allow parties to
stymie the process from the start by challenging orders to partici-
pate in nonbinding arbitration or another ADR process. For ex-
ample, the District of Columbia has elaborate Civil Arbitration
Program rules that allow parties to halt arbitration while they pur-
sue motions challenging a judge's assignment of their case to the
program. 10 5 Parties also may put the proceeding on hold while
they contest appointed arbitrators.0 6 Furthermore, even after the
arbitration proceedings get underway, the parties may stall the pro-
cess with requests for continuance. 10 7 The parties may then follow
proceedings with demands for trial de novo, and send the case back
101 See Wissler & Dauber, supra note 6, at 95-97 (concluding that evidence suggested that
Arizona's court-connected arbitration program was not fostering its efficiency goals).
102 John Barkai & Gene Kassebaum, Pushing Limits on Court-Annexed Arbitration: The Ha-
waii Experience, 14 JUST. Svs. J. 133, 135-37, 145-46 (1991) (noting survey findings that the
majority of cases sent to arbitration settled outside the arbitration or would have settled earlier
without the program in place, therefore raising questions whether arbitration is worth the extra
costs).
103 At the same time, parties' fear of signaling weakness also may hinder them from sug-
gesting or voluntarily agreeing to participate in ADR after a dispute arises. Bernstein, supra
note 15, at 2191.
104 Id. at 2192-97 (discussing how parties may use the nonbinding nature of these programs to
inflict delay costs on those who may lack the requisite resources).
105 See District of Columbia Rules of the Civil Arbitration Program, D.C. R. Civ. ARB. R. I-
XVI (current through Feb. 1, 2008) (detailing elaborate motion, hearings and determination
procedures for the program).
106 Id.
107 Id. at R. I-IX.
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through the litigation gauntlet. This results in an inefficient laby-
rinth of arbitration and court procedures that are more onerous
than simply allowing the parties to litigate their claims as they
sought to do in the first place. Parties waste time and money navi-
gating through this labyrinth, while courts expend needless re-
sources overseeing proceedings, dealing with motions, and
sometimes struggling to determine whether parties have complied
with duties to participate in good faith.10 8 Challenge and motion
procedures also leave room for parties to capitalize on power and
resource imbalances.
To be fair, this inefficient picture of the process is not reality in
all cases. As noted above, Nevada's program has been fairly suc-
cessful in terms of ending eighty percent of cases entering the pro-
gram and gaining acceptance among parties and attorneys over
time. 0 9 Furthermore, it seeks to foster well-informed decisions by
using two panels of arbitrators: tort and non-tort." 0 The ADR Of-
fice also strives to move cases along, reporting that an average case
takes between six and seven months to complete.111 Similarly,
North Carolina reported in the early 1990s that its carefully
planned court-ordered arbitration program reduced disposition
time and cut the trial rate from twenty to seven percent for the
eligible cases." 2
Nonetheless, as Judge Posner has noted, ADR programs may
be inefficient even if they induce settlement." 3 ADR programs
that cut trial rates still may increase overall dispute resolution costs
by providing government-paid assessments of parties' cases where
they could have settled privately, without usurping public time and
108 See Golann, supra note 8, at 492-94.
109 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing Nevada's arbitration program).
110 See E-mail from Chris Beecroft, Nev. ADR Comm., to Amy J. Schmitz, Associate Profes-
sor., U. Colo. L. Sch. (Oct. 21, 2008) (on file with author).
111 Id.
112 See Clarke et al., Court-Ordered Arbitration in North Carolina: Case Outcomes and Liti-
gant Satisfaction, 14 JUST. Svs. J. 154, 154-80 (1991) (reporting results from pilot program for
suits for damages not exceeding $15,000, and highlighting the importance of careful planning and
implementation of the program as aiding its success). It should be noted that the study did not
account for the costs of the planning and implementation of the process in assessing "success"
and whether the program reduced overall dispute resolution costs. See id.
113 See Posner, supra note 14, at 386-89 (discussing how ADR programs do not decrease
overall dispute resolution costs even if they induce settlement); see also Deborah R. Hensler,
Court-Ordered Arbitration: An Alternative View, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 399, 409-10 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Alternative View] (highlighting how assessment of arbitration programs' overall efficiency
must account for the costs of the planning and implementation of the arbitration processes
themselves).
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money.114 Evidence indicates that ADR programs may only stall
parties' settlements, and parties may simply use case evaluations
from nonbinding procedures in their own settlement negotiations.
For example, a 1993 study of ADR programs' impact in Michi-
gan federal court indicated that of the 1,691 cases referred to arbi-
tration during the studied period, twenty-two percent were
resolved through mutual acceptance of the arbitration decision.'1 5
Nonetheless, ninety-six percent of all cases referred to arbitration
ultimately settled without trial. None of the twenty-five personal
injury or products liability cases referred to mediation under a dif-
ferent Michigan program concluded through mutual acceptance of
the mediation award. Researchers concluded that it was unclear
how many cases would have settled outside of the program and
whether any increase in the number of cases that settle before trial
was sufficient to justify the costs of the program overall." 6
Furthermore, there is evidence that many programs do not in-
crease settlement or decrease trial rates." 7 Studies from the late
1980s and early 1990s indicate that arbitration programs often have
little to no impact on settlement rates.118 The recent study of the
federal government's use of ADR in federal courts indicates that
only half of the cases in court-ordered ADR settled, while parties
settled in nearly three-fourths of cases using voluntary private
ADR. 119
A 2007 study of Arizona's court-connected arbitration pro-
gram's performance indicates only thirty-nine percent of cases sub-
ject to arbitration settled, while fifty-five percent of cases outside
the program settled.12 0 Furthermore, not even half of the cases as-
signed to the arbitration program concluded in nine months in ac-
cordance with Arizona's Supreme Court's Case Processing
114 Thomas D. Dyze, ADR's Impact on the Resolution of Cases in the Michigan Federal
Courts, 74 MICH. Bus. L.J. 654 (1995) (noting how attorneys may use the ADR programs to get
government-sponsored assessment of their cases).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See Hensler, Alternative View, supra note 113, at 408-13 (1990) (reporting study results of
several court-mandated arbitration programs' efficiency in terms of time, settlement rates, and
court costs).
118 Id.
119 Bingham et al., supra note 96, at 34-41 (reporting results of the study and noting its limita-
tions, as well as the need for further research).
120 Wissler & Dauber, supra note 6, at 75-79 (further explaining that more arbitration than
civil cases used court resources through hearings on the merits).
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Standards. 121 Researchers concluded that more cases likely would
have concluded early with minimal court involvement were there
no arbitration program in place.' 22
Similarly, researchers found that the mandatory nonbinding
arbitration program the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas
adopted for its asbestos cases in the early 1980s did not promote
efficient settlement of the flood of these cases at the time. 23
Under this program, judges held truncated hearings and rendered
advisory opinions intended to induce settlement. The program was
ultimately unsuccessful, and courts "could not keep up with the
flood of asbestos case fillings even by using this streamlined pro-
cess in lieu of trial."'12 4
Court-connected arbitration may thus resemble a bad
preseason football game. The players may go through the motions
knowing that the results do not "matter" in that they do not "bind"
the parties on the record. Teams may then waste resources and
suffer needless injuries in the game. They may also keep their best
players out of the fray to save them for the "real thing" to the
extent disputants may refrain from offering their best evidence in
arbitration to preserve its effect for the trial de novo they plan to
pursue after the arbitral "preseason" is over. The difference is that
football teams usually make money entertaining the public through
preseason games, whereas courts and disputants often lose and
waste resources through court-connected arbitral labyrinths.
2. Unfair Impacts of Arbitration Subject to Trial De Novo
Policymakers adopt mandatory programs in hopes of provid-
ing cost and efficiency benefits often associated with private con-
sensual ADR. They hope that court-connected arbitration will
ease judicial caseloads, and save courts and disputants time and
money in resolving their disputes. Efficiency is not the only goal of
these arbitration programs. Policymakers also surmise that these
programs will foster fairness and aid parties in obtaining remedies
in small-dollar claims that parties may not be equipped to pursue in
121 These are the standards stated for ninety percent of the program cases. Id. at 79-83 (not-
ing only forty percent of the cases in Maricopa County concluded within the nine months).
122 Id. at 77-78.
123 See Hensler, Half Full, supra note 2, at 1607 (discussing different ADR experiments courts
have used to address mass personal injury litigation).
124 Id. (noting that despite signs of initial success, the court could not schedule trials quickly
enough to keep up with the requests for trial de novo).
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court. 2 5 These laudatory goals, however, are seldom met through
such court-connected arbitration programs.
Instead, as discussed above, these arbitration programs often
do little to reduce total dispute resolution costs or time. This is
especially true when programs do not include sufficiently strong
disincentives to demanding trial de novo, although tougher disin-
centives also may unfairly limit parties' trial rights. 26 Allowance
for trial de novo often renders arbitration a superfluous but expen-
sive dispute resolution process. Unlike binding arbitration under
the FAA, court-connected arbitration determinations have no
binding or estoppel effects, thereby allowing one party to force all
the disputants to re-litigate arbitrated issues in court by requesting
trial de novo. This burdens all the parties as well as the courts.
Moreover, this dual process structure, coupled with disincen-
tives for seeking trial de novo, works to the disadvantage of those
with the least resources. 27 Expenses and risks of penalties for
seeking trial de novo may prevent these parties from pursing legiti-
mate or warranted challenges of unfavorable arbitration awards,
thus leaving them to unhappily "live with" nominally nonbinding
awards. In contrast, parties with greater economic and litigation
resources may be inclined to reject awards and seek trial de novo.
They may not fear costs of a protracted process, or even risks of
penalties for pursing a trial de novo that does not produce a suffi-
ciently better result than that obtained in arbitration. 12 8 This opens
the door for the more powerful parties to litigate the less powerful
to economic death.
Disproportionate burdens of costs and penalties of seeking
trial de novo may fall hardest on those with small dollar claims,
especially to the extent arbitration and litigation costs do not vary
with case size.' 29 For example, consumers may have valid but
small-dollar claims regarding cell phone and service provider
charges that they may forego due to potentially high litigation
costs. Court-connected programs generally target such small dollar
claims in hopes of providing means for these consumers to pursue
125 See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 2197-99 (discussing justifications for courts' arbitration
programs).
126 Id. at 2210-15.
127 Id. at 2215-38 (highlighting how programs may disproportionately burden weaker parties
due to their nonbinding nature).
128 See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text (discussing program rules providing such
disincentives to seeking trial de novo).
129 See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 2231-33 (noting how fee and cost-shifting provisions may
overly burden those with small dollar claims).
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remedies, and thereby perhaps police providers' practices. How-
ever, consumers who are forced to participate in individual arbitra-
tion proceedings may be effectively prevented from joining
together to assert class actions, which may be the only realistic ve-
hicle for policing companies' conduct in some cases. 130 Further-
more, consumers may simply lack resources to pursue the ordered
arbitration before enduring a subsequent trial de novo.
In addition, courts may inadvertently perpetuate emotional
harms by mandating a private dispute resolution process without
sufficient regard for emotional proclivities or context.' For exam-
ple, some harassment claimants are so fearful of an alleged har-
asser that forced participation in a private, more intimate process
could be psychologically harmful. A claimant's intimidation and
legal inexperience also may prevent the claimant from fully and
effectively presenting his or her case in the arbitration. 132 More
powerful parties may then use their resources and tactical tools to
essentially scare the weaker parties into accepting one-sided settle-
ment terms.133
Arguably, enforcement of an arbitration agreement under the
FAA also may be detrimental or unfair in such cases. However,
such arbitration is at least pursuant to the parties' contract and will
result in a final award. This finality provides more closure than a
nonbinding procedure, thereby minimizing parties' power to scare
opponents into accepting one-sided settlements under threats of
trial de novo expenses or prolonged painful dealings with opposing
parties. Furthermore, courts may use contract defenses such as
lack of assent or unconscionability to preclude enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate in FAA cases.1,3
130 It is doubtful, however, that a court would order a consumer to mandatory arbitration
prior to joining a class action in progress.
131 See Golann, supra note 8, at 492-94 (noting how ADR may not be effective in all cases).
132 See Amy J. Schmitz, Confronting ADR Agreements' Contract/No-Contract Conundrum
with Good Faith, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 55, 106 (2006) (critiquing application of the FAA to non-
binding procedures and discussing cases in which enforcement of agreements to mediate should
not be specifically enforced).
133 See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 2194-97 (discussing how parties may use their asymmetric
ability to bear costs of delay and bargaining power in nonbinding arbitration programs). See also
Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 46-68 (1999) (discussing why and when a party may seek an injunction or
specific performance to gain bargaining advantage although performance of the contract would
be inefficient).
134 JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 2.5, 2.11, 4.2, 9.1
(4th ed. 1998) (explaining basic enforcement rules, and the doctrinal defenses of duress, undue
influence, misrepresentation, mistake and unconscionability). Nonetheless, there are strong ar-
guments for legislation such as the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782 & H.R. 3010, 110th
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Finality is considered a virtue of FAA arbitration because it
promotes not only efficiency, but also fairness. 135  For example,
courts have recognized the unfairness of differential impacts of
trial de novo in refusing to enforce arbitration requirements in in-
surance contracts that allow for such review if the award exceeds a
certain amount. 36 They recognized that trial de novo clauses act as
unfair escape hatches parties may use to play games of wait-and-
see or to take advantage of uneven litigation resources. 137  One
Cong. (2007) (primarily sponsored by Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI) and Rep. Hank Johnson (D-
GA), respectively). See Paul D. Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution Provisions in Adhe-
sion Contracts, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 225 (1998) (suggesting legislative regulation of consumer,
employment, and franchise arbitration).
135 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing Hall Street's holding that the
FAA precluded parties from contractually expanding court review of arbitration awards under
the FAA).
136 These programs have been most prevalent for resolution of uninsured motorist disputes.
See, e.g., Parker v. American Family Ins. Co., 734 N.E.2d 83, 84-86 (Ill. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
738 N.E.2d 928 (Ill. 2000) (also refusing to enforce trial de novo clause).
137 See Parker, 734 N.E.2d at 84-86 (holding trial de novo clause in uninsured motorist policy
violated public policy because it harmed arbitration's value and unfairly favored insurers); Saika
v. Gold, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 923-27 (Ct. App. 1996) (voiding trial de novo provision in physi-
cian's contract with his patient); Goulart v. Crum & Forster Pers. Ins. Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 627,
627-28 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding insurance code arbitration provision prevented either party
from seeking trial de novo); Huizar v. Allstate Ins. Co., 952 P.2d 342, 346-49 (Colo. 1998) (en
banc) (holding that insurance agreement allowing either party to request trial de novo if the
award exceeded $25,000 was against public policy); Field v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 769 F. Supp.
1135, 1140-42 (D. Haw. 1991) (finding trial de novo would destroy arbitration's value, and thus
striking the provision and requiring limited judicial review under Hawaii's arbitration statute);
Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 1242, 1244-51 (Ohio 1992) (holding nonbinding "arbi-
tration" unenforceable); Spalsbury v. Hunter Realty, Inc., No. 76874, 2000 WL 1753436 at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2000) (concluding that even if Hunter had been party to the arbitration
agreement, the nonbinding clause was void as against public policy); Zook v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
503 A.2d 24, 25-27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (finding trial de novo provision ambiguous and thus
unenforceable, especially because "a court of competent jurisdiction is only empowered to dis-
turb the arbitration award if there is evidence of fraud, misconduct, corruption or some other
irregularity which caused the rendition of an unjust, inequitable or unconscionable award");
Slaiman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 A.2d 873 (R.I. 1992) (holding trial de novo provision violates
public policy); Godfrey v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 16 P.3d 617, 621-23 (Wash. 2001) (en banc)
(holding trial de novo provision unenforceable because courts will not "condone what amounts
to a waste of judicial resources" or go through arbitration "only to see if it goes well for their
position before invoking the courts' jurisdiction"); Petersen v. United Services Auto. Assoc., 955
P.2d 852, 854-56 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (voiding trial de novo provision because "[tihe purpose
of arbitration is to avoid the courts to resolve a dispute"). Although Hall Street may now direct
a different result, some cases have upheld these trial de novo clauses as valid exercises of con-
tractual liberty. See Hayden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 649, 651-53 (N.D. Ind. 1998)
(holding insurance contract provision allowing either party to request trial de novo if the award
exceeded Indiana financial responsibility limits was not against public policy because the "court
is not required to favor arbitration over the unambiguous term of the contract"); Liberty Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Mandile, 963 P.2d 295, 296-300 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (allowing appeal of arbitra-
tion award under contract incorporating an appeal provision that was part of the state's statutory
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court held that a trial de novo provision in a doctor/patient arbitra-
tion agreement violated public policy where it allowed litigation if
a malpractice claim exceeded $25,000.138 The court emphasized, "a
nonfinal arbitration is, in the last analysis, an oxymoron. "139
Similarly, other courts have concluded that non-final arbitra-
tion is not even "arbitration" due to its incongruent nature. 140 The
Supreme Court of Colorado in Huizar v. Allstate Ins. Co., 952 P.2d
342 (Colo. 1998),141 for example, severed a trial de novo provision
from an uninsured motorist insurance policy that permitted a party
to demand trial de novo after arbitration if the award exceeded a
specified limit.142 The court then enforced the arbitration award
under the limited review standards of Colorado's adoption of the
UAA. It found that the clause violated Colorado's constitutional
and legislative policies advancing timely resolution of claims. 143
This is not to say that nonbinding evaluative procedures are
always inefficient or unfair. One study indicated that litigants and
attorneys have been satisfied with court-connected arbitration
compulsory arbitration system and therefore properly could be part of contractual arbitration
procedures); Kaplan v. Conn. Pleasure Tours, No. 557609, 2001 WL 528123 (Conn. Super. Ct.
May 1, 2001) (ordering trial de novo under an arbitration agreement that required the requesting
party to pay all costs of arbitration); Roe v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 533 So.2d 279, 281 (Fla. 1988)
(finding Florida's enactment of the UAA did not apply to a nonbinding arbitration award ren-
dered pursuant to an arbitration agreement allowing either party to seek trial de novo); Cohen v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 555 A.2d 21, 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 563 A.2d 846 (N.J.
1989) (finding trial de novo clause in uninsured motorist contract was enforceable in order to
effectuate the intent of the parties); Bruch v. CAN Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 749, 751-52 (N.M. 1994)
(enforcing trial de novo clause in insurance arbitration provision although the courts "strongly
encourage final settlement by arbitration").
138 Saika, 56 Cal. Rptr.2d at 925-27.
139 Id. at 923. See also Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1244-46.
140 See Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1244-46. The court recognized "that the real problem lies in
the imprecise use of the term 'arbitration,"' and stated that arbitration necessarily "must be
final, binding and without any qualification or condition as to the finality of an award whether or
not agreed to by the parties." Id. at 1245. The court concluded that by creating an "escape
hatch," the ADR provision was "not a provision providing for true arbitration," and therefore
was unenforceable. Id. at 1248 (emphasis omitted). This meant that the trial de novo provision
left the parties "with no valid alternative-dispute-resolution procedure" and thus they could liti-
gate their claims in court. Id. at 1248-49.
141 952 P.2d 342 (Colo. 1998) (en banc).
142 Id. at 343-49. The policy required that disputes regarding damages were to be "settled by
arbitration" but if the award exceeded $25,000, either party could request a trial on all issues
within 60 days of the award. Id. at 343-44.
143 Id. at 348-49. The court explained that substantive judicial review of these arbitration
awards would thwart the program goal of minimizing insurers' power to use their superior eco-
nomic resources to out-litigate insureds. Id. at 346-48. The court stressed that "unproductive
delay is entirely inconsistent with the public policy in favor of a speedy resolution of disputes."
Id. at 348.
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processes. 44 Winners and losers in the study reported satisfaction
with arbitration at the same rates as that obtained through trial.4
In contrast, litigants who settled their cases through court-medi-
ated conferences reported significantly lower rates of satisfac-
tion.' 46 That said, it is unclear whether encouraging satisfaction
rates justifies the costs of ADR programs. This is especially true
due to the lack of information on whether parties would have been
just as satisfied if they had settled privately without any judicial
intervention.
It may be that cheaper and less intrusive court programs could
augment process satisfaction while also increasing overall effi-
ciency of dispute resolution. For example, technological advances
and expansion of Internet capabilities have provided promise for
use of On-line Dispute Resolution ("ODR"). 4 7 Although ODR
has its uncertainties and lacks the human element of face-to-face
contact, it increases the range of connection and communication
possibilities. 48  The Internet allows for flexible scheduling and
asynchronous communication, as well as interactive dialogue. 149
Furthermore, online arbitration may be particularly effective and
efficient because of this flexibility and the reduced need for face-
to-face interaction and the type of complicated communication
processes that may be necessary in more facilitative ADR
processes. 5 °
The Internet is already providing means for dispute resolution
processes. For example, a non-final on-line administrative resolu-
tion process under the Uniform Dispute Resolution Procedures
("UDRP") through Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
144 See Hensler, supra note 113, at 415-16 (noting research indicating satisfaction with the
process).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 416-17 (noting how "litigants believe that both arbitration and trial are more fair
than settlement conferences," and how this is significant in light of the prevalence of settlement
conferences).
147 See Haitham A. Haloush & Bashar H. Malkawi, Internet Characteristics and Online Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 327, 327-29 (2008) (discussing how use of
Online ADR can foster efficient dispute resolution and maximize the growth of e-commerce in
England and abroad).
148 Id. at 328-34 (explaining how use of ODR provides beneficial and efficient avenues for
communication that may transcend benefits of the face-to-face environment in traditional
ADR).
149 Id. at 330-32.
150 Id. at 340-47 (explaining how on-line arbitration provides cost and time savings for parties
and neutrals). "[T]he opportunities for using the virtual capabilities of electronic media in law-
related processes are enormous. For instance, computer facilitated charts, figures, graphs, scales,
tables, and diagrams can be utilized in OADR proceedings." Id. at 343.
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Numbers ("ICANN") has shown some instances of success. 151 Par-
ties have used the UDRP on-line procedure to obtain a relatively
quick and cheap determination of who may use a contested domain
name. These UDRP procedures allow parties to present their
cases on-line to obtain a written nonbinding decision on their
claims. 52 Although the process has been subject to criticism, it
provides an example of how the Internet may be used to promote
efficient dispute resolution, especially in communal and specialized
areas.
1 53
Nonetheless, the Internet creates challenges and opportunities
for ADR. It is easy to see how ODR can foster efficient dispute
resolution. The bigger challenge is to ensure fair process and party
satisfaction. Indeed, any ODR program must be developed with
values and standards of ADR as guideposts, along with keen
awareness of resource and access differentials. 154
151 See Jason M. Osborn, Note, Effective and Complementary Solutions to Domain Name Dis-
putes: Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy and the Federal Anticybersquatting Con-
sumer Protection Act of 1999, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 209, 210-21 (2000). The UDRP was
adopted on August 26, 1999 and the implementation documents were approved on October 24,
1999. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN): Rules for Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 39 I.L.M. 952 (2000) [hereinafter UDRP Rules]; WIO Arbi-
tration Rules, available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/rules/index.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2008).
152 The UDRP proceedings do not constitute binding arbitration under the FAA. Parisi v.
Netlearning, Inc., 139 F.Supp. 745, 749-53 (E.D. Va. 2001). See also Lockheed Martin Corp v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651-52 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (explaining UDRP's pur-
pose and process, and noting that the average time from filing to decision is fifty-two days);
Virtual Countries, Inc. v. Republic of S. Africa, 148 F. Supp. 2d 256, 259-61, 265 n.10 (S.D.N.Y
2001) (explaining UDRP's development, and doubting that ICANN would amend the UDRP's
nonbinding administrative procedure to provide for binding arbitration). See also Speidel, supra
note 70, at 188-90 (concluding that the RUAA does not apply to UDRP determinations and
aptly noting other important limitations of the RUAA's unitary approach to complex arbitration
issues in public policy contexts). Furthermore, the UDRP is not court-connected or subject to
governmental fairness oversight.
153 Proceedings must be on-line unless the panel specifically determines that it is "an excep-
tional matter" and therefore an in-person, telephonic, or teleconferenced hearing is necessary.
UDRP Rules, supra note 151, at 957-60. In addition, they only cover cancellation and transfer of
the domain names abusively registered and not claims for damages or injunctive relief other than
return of a domain name. Id. at 952; see also Luke A. Walker, ICANN's Uniform Doman Name
Dispute Resolution Policy, 15 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 289, 299-302 (2000); Eresolution: Noodle
Time, Inc. v. Max Mktg, 39 INTERNAT'L LEG. MATERIALS JUDICIAL AND SIMILAR PROCEEDINGS
795, 797 (2000) (finding Max Marketing had acquired the benihanaoftokyo.com domain name in
violation of UDRP cybersquatting rules and ordering transfer of the domain name to the com-
plainant). Any judicial determination of a respondent's appeal will trump the panel's decision,
provided that ICANN receives documentation regarding the lawsuit within ten days after it is
notified of the decision. Osborn, supra note 151, at 220 (citing UDRP Procedure 4(k)).
154 See Haloush & Malkawi, supra note 147, at 348.
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The problem is that staid court-connected nonbinding arbitra-
tion lacks this relatively inexpensive and flexible nature. Parties
forced to pursue court-connected arbitration as a precursor to liti-
gation do not simply arbitrate on-line. Furthermore, they may be
predisposed to refuse to accept an award due to resistance to any
imposed process, grudges against other parties or fears of appear-
ing "weak." Moreover, the burdens of the resulting labyrinth of
arbitration and litigation processes generally fall hardest on those
with the least resources. Contrary to the goals of court-connected
programs, these programs may decrease dispute resolution effi-
ciency and unfairly burden those with small dollar claims.
V. CONCLUSION
Nonbinding, nonconsensual arbitration is often nonsensical. It
strives to provide the same types of efficiency benefits commonly
associated with private arbitration under the FAA. However, it
often fails to deliver these benefits due to its court-ordered charac-
ter and allowance for trial de novo. Instead, it often produces inef-
ficient and burdensome hassles and costs for courts and disputants.
These hassles and costs may foster unfairness by disproportionately
burdening those with the least power and resources.
Accordingly, it is time for policymakers to abandon these
mandatory arbitration programs. Instead, policymakers should
consider using more innovative processes such as ODR to better
serve goals of efficiency, fairness and justice. Policymakers now
have opportunity to explore these processes for fostering restora-
tive and more efficient dispute resolution. Such processes may not
only save time and money, but may also ease tensions and protect
parties from facing emotionally harmful confrontations. This may
result in overall cost reductions while promoting more amicable
settlements through the Internet's virtual "space."
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